|本期目录/Table of Contents|

[1]王伟,刘晓雅,卢菊花,等.“数字化集中仓”模式下危化品仓储安全监管的演化博弈分析*[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2023,19(1):156-161.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2023.01.023]
　WANG Wei,LIU Xiaoya,LU Juhua,et al.Evolutionary game analysis of safety supervision for hazardous chemicals warehousing under “digital centralized warehouse” mode[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2023,19(1):156-161.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2023.01.023]
点击复制

“数字化集中仓”模式下危化品仓储安全监管的演化博弈分析*
分享到：

《中国安全生产科学技术》[ISSN:1673-193X/CN:11-5335/TB]

卷:
19
期数:
2023年1期
页码:
156-161
栏目:
职业安全卫生管理与技术
出版日期:
2023-01-31

文章信息/Info

Title:
Evolutionary game analysis of safety supervision for hazardous chemicals warehousing under “digital centralized warehouse” mode
文章编号:
1673-193X(2023)-01-0156-06
作者:
王伟; 刘晓雅; 卢菊花; 丁黎黎; 张文思
（1.中国海洋大学 经济学院，山东 青岛 266100；
2.青岛恒星科技学院 机械与汽车工程学院，山东 青岛 266100）
Author(s):
WANG Wei;  LIU Xiaoya;  LU Juhua;  DING Lili;  ZHANG Wensi
(1.School of Economics,Ocean University of China,Qingdao Shandong 266100,China;
2.School of Mechanical and Automotive Engineering,Qingdao Hengxing University of Science and Technology,Qingdao Shandong 266100,China)
关键词:
演化博弈; 集中式仓储; 数字化; 政府监管; 危化品
Keywords:
evolutionary game;  centralized warehousing;  digitization;  government supervision;  hazardous chemicals
分类号:
X937
DOI:
10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2023.01.023
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
针对利用数字化技术提高危化品仓储安全监管水平问题，考虑政府搭建“危化品集中式仓储中心+数字化网络监管平台”策略，基于演化博弈理论，构建危化品仓储安全监管演化博弈模型，分析建立数字化集中仓概率（本文简称“建仓概率”）对相关政府部门和危化品仓储企业行为演化规律的影响，探讨数字化集中仓模式下，危化品仓储企业合规仓储的驱动因素。研究结果表明：当建仓概率低于某临界值时，政府部门和危化品仓储企业会疏于监管违规仓储；随着建仓概率提高，政府部门和危化品仓储企业策略呈现周期性波动现象；当建仓概率很高时，虽然数字化集中仓一定程度上可提高政府监管便利性，但从长远看会使政府监管部门放松对危化品仓储安全的监管。研究结果可为政府推行数字化监管新模式和危化品仓储企业实施智能仓储管理提供一定决策支持。
Abstract:
Aiming at the problems in improving safety supervision level for hazardous chemicals warehousing by the use of digital technology,the government’s strategy of building “hazardous chemicals centralized warehousing center+digital network supervision platform” was considered and an evolutionary game model of the safety supervision on hazardous chemicals warehousing was constructed based on the evolutionary game theory.The influence of the probability of building a digital centralized warehouse (hereinafter referred to as the “probability of building warehouse”) on the behavior evolution law of relevant government departments and hazardous chemicals warehousing enterprises was analyzed,and the driving factors of compliance warehousing of hazardous chemicals warehousing enterprises under the digital centralized warehouse mode were discussed.The results showed that when the probability of building warehouse was lower than a certain critical value,the government departments and hazardous materials warehousing enterprises would relax supervision and illegal warehousing.With the increase in the probability of building warehouse,the strategies of government departments and hazardous chemicals warehousing enterprises presented the periodic fluctuation.When the probability of building warehouse was high,although the digital centralized warehouse improved the convenience of government supervision to a certain extent,it would make the government supervision departments relax the supervision on hazardous chemicals warehousing safety in the long run.The research results can provide decision support for the government to implement the new mode of digital supervision and the hazardous chemicals warehousing enterprises to implement the intelligent warehousing management.

参考文献/References:

［1］WANG B,LI D L,WU C.Characteristics of hazardous chemical accidents during hot season in China from 1989 to 2019:a statistical investigation［J］.Safety Science,2020,129:104788.
［2］刘斌,陈刚,袁浩,等.基于UWB的危化品智能仓储管理系统研究［J］.工业安全与环保,2022,48(10):32-36. LIU Bin,CHEN Gang,YUAN Hao,et al.Research on intelligent ware house management system of hazardous chemicals based on UWB technology［J］.Industrial Safety and Environmental Protection,2022,48 (10):32-36.
［3］WANG J H,FU G,YAN M W.Comparative analysis of two catastrophic hazardous chemical accidents in China［J］.Process Safety Progress,2020,39(1):e12137.
［4］LI Y,WANG H,BAI K,et al.Dynamic intelligent risk assessment of hazardous chemical warehouse fire based on electrostatic discharge method and improved support vector machine［J］.Process Safety and Environmental Protection,2021,145:425-434.
［5］胡鹏,帅斌,吴贞瑶,等.危化品仓储运输突发事故跟踪目标准确识别［J］.计算机仿真,2019,36(6):358-363. HU Peng,SHUAI Bin,WU Zhenyao,et al.Target tracking and accurately identifying under transportation emergency of hazardous materials warehousing［J］.Computer Simulation,2019,36(6):358-363.
［6］刘学君,卢浩,李京,等.基于分布式测温的危化品立库火灾定位系统［J］.控制工程,2020,7:1175-1179. LIU Xuejun,LU Hao,LI Jing,et al.Study of fire location system for automatic stereoscopic warehouse of hazardous chemicals based on distributed temperature measuring［J］.Control Engineering of China,2020,7:1175-1179.
［7］戴波,周泽或,安海洋,等.基于虚拟力的危化品仓储堆垛定位校正算法［J］.中国安生产科学技术,2018,14(3):65-71. DAI Bo,ZHOU Zehuo,AN Haiyang,et al.Location correction algorithm of hazardous chemicals storage stacking based on virtual force［J］.Journal of Safety Science and Technology,2018,14(3):65-71.
［8］韩震,王菡,孟好.基于系统动力学的港口危险品管理演化博弈分析［J］.大连海事大学学报,2019,45(2):28-35. HAN Zhen,WANG Han,MENG Hao.Evolutionary game analysis of hazardous goods management in ports based on system dynamics［J］.Journal of Dalian Maritime University,2019,45(2):28-35.
［9］GAO H H,CAO G M,XING D N.Evolutionary dynamics of the port hazardous chemical logistics enterprises’ security behavior under dynamic punishment［J］.Journal of Coastal Research,2019(9)：437-442.
［10］张季平.考虑事故发生率的危化品物流企业运营监管研究［J］.系统科学与数学,2020,40(3):495-509. ZHANG Jiping.Research on the supervision of dangerous goods logistics enterprises operations with consideration of accident rate［J］.Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences,2020,40(3):495-509.
［11］FAN W,WANG S,GU X,et al.Evolutionary game analysis on industrial pollution control of local government in China［J］.Journal of Environmental Management,2021,298:113499.
［12］WANG J,QIN Y,ZHOU J.Incentive policies for prefabrication implementation of real estate enterprises:an evolutionary game theory-based analysis［J］.Energy Policy,2021,156:112434.
［13］王循庆,李勇建,孙晓羽.基于演化博弈的危化品安全监管情景推演研究［J］.中国安全生产科学技术,2017,13(1):115-121. WANG Xunqing,LI Yongjian,SUN Xiaoyu.Study on scenario inference of hazardous chemicals safety supervision based on evolutionary game［J］.Journal of Safety Science and Technology,2017,13(1):115-121.
［14］王伟,王晓楠,丁黎黎,等.多部门协作下危化品运输监管的演化博弈［J］.中国安全科学学报,2020,30(10):69-74. WANG Wei,WANG Xiaonan,DING Lili,et al.Research on evolutionary game of hazardous materials transportation and supervision based on multi-sectoral collaboration［J］.China Safety Science Journal,2020,30(10):69-74.
［15］王伟,王晓楠,丁黎黎,等.考虑公众监督的政府与危险品运输企业的演化博弈分析［J］.系统科学学报,2022(1):92-96,136. WANG Wei,WANG Xiaonan,DING Lili,et al.Analysis on evolution game of government and hazardous materials transportation enterprise under public supervision［J］.Chinese Journal of Systems Science,2022(1):92-96,136.

相似文献/References:

[1]王文轲.基于有限理性的煤矿安全投资演化博弈研究[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2013,9(11):65.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2013.11.011]
　WANG Wen ke.Research on the coal mine safety investment evolutionary game based on limited rationality[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2013,9(1):65.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2013.11.011]
[2]王循庆,李勇建,孙晓羽.基于演化博弈的危化品安全监管情景推演研究[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2017,13(1):115.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2017.01.019]
　WANG Xunqing,LI Yongjian,SUN Xiaoyu.Study on scenario inference of hazardous chemicals safety supervision based on evolutionary game[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2017,13(1):115.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2017.01.019]
[3]王循庆,孙晓羽.基于公众参与行为的化工企业监管治理演化博弈分析[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2018,14(3):180.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2018.03.027]
　WANG Xunqing,SUN Xiaoyu.Evolutionary game analysis on supervision governance of chemical enterprises based on public participation behavior[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2018,14(1):180.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2018.03.027]
[4]王志强,刘硕,马婷婷,等.风险偏好视角下地铁施工安全群体行为博弈研究[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2020,16(3):138.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2020.03.022]
　WANG Zhiqiang,LIU Shuo,MA Tingting,et al.Study on behavioral game of metro construction safety groups under perspective of risk preference[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2020,16(1):138.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2020.03.022]
[5]朱姝帆,桂萍.重大疫情下冷链应急物流协同配送决策博弈分析[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2020,16(6):30.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2020.06.005]
　ZHU Shufan,GUI Ping.Game analysis on collaborative distribution decisionmaking of cold chain emergency logistics under major epidemic situation[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2020,16(1):30.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2020.06.005]
[6]杨耀红,曾怡,代静,等.基于前景理论的施工安全事故网络舆论监督演化博弈分析*[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2022,18(1):132.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2022.01.021]
　YANG Yaohong,ZENG Yi,DAI Jing,et al.Evolutionary game analysis on network public opinion supervision of construction safety accidents based on prospect theory[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2022,18(1):132.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2022.01.021]
[7]王新平,张子鸣,孙林辉,等.工作场所正念视角下智慧矿山矿工安全行为演化博弈*[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2022,18(2):125.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2022.02.019]
　WANG Xinping,ZHANG Ziming,SUN Linhui,et al.Evolutionary game on safety behavior of miners in smart mine from perspective of workplace mindfulness[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2022,18(1):125.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2022.02.019]
[8]刘纪坤,黄杰.煤矿领导者和监管者的行为决策演化博弈分析*[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2022,18(3):100.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2022.03.015]
　LIU Jikun,HUANG Jie.Evolutionary game analysis on behavioral decision of coal mine leaders and supervisors[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2022,18(1):100.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2022.03.015]
[9]张跃斌,易欣,宋璋玉,等.基于SD的装配式建筑施工安全监管演化博弈研究*[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2022,18(3):149.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2022.03.023]
　ZHANG Yuebin,YI Xin,SONG Zhangyu,et al.Research on evolutionary game of safety supervision for prefabricated building construction based on SD[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2022,18(1):149.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2022.03.023]
[10]李圆圆,孙李傲,袁文燕,等.考虑恐怖袭击下危险品运输安全监管的演化博弈与稳定性分析*[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2022,18(5):18.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2022.05.003]
　LI Yuanyuan,SUN Liao,YUAN Wenyan,et al.Evolutionary game and stability analysis of safety supervision on hazmat transportation considering terrorist attack[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2022,18(1):18.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2022.05.003]

备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期： 2021-10-19
* 基金项目： 国家自然科学基金项目（71701189,71973132）
作者简介： 王伟，博士，副教授，主要研究方向为危化品物流管理。
通信作者： 丁黎黎，博士，教授，主要研究方向为管理科学与工程。
更新日期/Last Update: 2023-02-14