|本期目录/Table of Contents|

[1]王循庆,孙晓羽.基于公众参与行为的化工企业监管治理演化博弈分析[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2018,14(3):180-186.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2018.03.027]
　WANG Xunqing,SUN Xiaoyu.Evolutionary game analysis on supervision governance of chemical enterprises based on public participation behavior[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2018,14(3):180-186.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2018.03.027]
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基于公众参与行为的化工企业监管治理演化博弈分析
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《中国安全生产科学技术》[ISSN:1673-193X/CN:11-5335/TB]

卷:
14
期数:
2018年3期
页码:
180-186
栏目:
职业安全卫生管理与技术
出版日期:
2018-03-31

文章信息/Info

Title:
Evolutionary game analysis on supervision governance of chemical enterprises based on public participation behavior
文章编号:
1673-193X(2018)-03-0180-07
作者:
王循庆; 孙晓羽
（山东工商学院 公共管理学院，山东 烟台 264005）
Author(s):
WANG Xunqing;  SUN Xiaoyu
(School of Public Administration, Shandong Technology and Business University, Yantai Shandong 264005, China)
关键词:
化工企业; 公众参与行为; 演化博弈; 演化稳定策略
Keywords:
chemical enterprise;  public participation behavior;  evolutionary game;  evolution stable strategy
分类号:
X913.4
DOI:
10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2018.03.027
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
化工生产安全事故频发对社会生活和公共安全造成严重影响。针对化工企业监管治理问题，将公众参与行为纳入到监管过程，基于演化博弈理论构建地方政府、化工企业、公众三方博弈策略收益矩阵，对比分析各博弈主体行为策略的演化稳定均衡。研究结果表明：对于化工企业，降低企业安全投入成本、加大政府处罚力度和提高政府严格监管的概率，将促使化工企业更倾向于选择安全投入策略；对于地方政府，降低政府的监管成本、增大上级政府的问责和对疏忽安全投入企业的罚款力度，将有助于地方政府最终选择严格监管策略；对于公众，降低监督举报的成本和提高对公众监督举报行为的奖励，将有利于公众积极参与监督，实现对化工企业的有效监管治理。
Abstract:
The frequent occurrence of chemical work safety accidents has caused serious impact on the social life and public safety. Aiming at the problem about the supervision governance of the chemical enterprises, the public participation behavior was incorporated into the supervision process, and a payoff matrix of trilateral game strategy for the local government, chemical enterprises and public was established based on the evolutionary game theory, and the evolutionary stable equilibrium of the behavior strategy for each game subject was compared and analyzed. The results showed that for the chemical enterprises, reducing the safety investment cost of enterprises, increasing the punishment strength and the probability of strict supervision of the government would prompt the chemical enterprises to tend to choose the safety investment strategies. For the local government, reducing the supervision cost of government, increasing the accountability of superior government and the penalty strength on the enterprises neglecting the safety investment would be beneficial for the local government to choose the strict supervision strategies finally. For the public, reducing the cost of surveillance and reporting and improving the rewards for the surveillance and reporting behavior of public would be beneficial for the public to participate in the surveillance actively, so as to realize the effective supervision governance of the chemical enterprises.

参考文献/References:

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
国家自然科学基金项目(71603109,71704001,71572125);山东省自然科学基金项目(ZR2016GB04)
更新日期/Last Update: 2018-04-11