|本期目录/Table of Contents|

[1]李圆圆,孙李傲,袁文燕,等.考虑恐怖袭击下危险品运输安全监管的演化博弈与稳定性分析*[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2022,18(5):18-24.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2022.05.003]
　LI Yuanyuan,SUN Liao,YUAN Wenyan,et al.Evolutionary game and stability analysis of safety supervision on hazmat transportation considering terrorist attack[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2022,18(5):18-24.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2022.05.003]
点击复制

考虑恐怖袭击下危险品运输安全监管的演化博弈与稳定性分析*
分享到：

《中国安全生产科学技术》[ISSN:1673-193X/CN:11-5335/TB]

卷:
18
期数:
2022年5期
页码:
18-24
栏目:
学术论著
出版日期:
2022-05-31

文章信息/Info

Title:
Evolutionary game and stability analysis of safety supervision on hazmat transportation considering terrorist attack
文章编号:
1673-193X(2022)-05-0018-07
作者:
李圆圆; 孙李傲; 袁文燕; 吴军
（1.北京化工大学 经济管理学院，北京 100029；
2.北京化工大学 数理学院，北京 100029）
Author(s):
LI Yuanyuan;  SUN Li’ao;  YUAN Wenyan;  WU Jun
(1.School of Economics and Management,Beijing University of Chemical Technology,Beijing 100029,China;
2.School of Mathematics,Beijing University of Chemical Technology,Beijing 100029,China)
关键词:
危险品运输; 安全监管; 恐怖袭击; 演化博弈; 系统动力学
Keywords:
hazmat transportation;  safety supervision;  terrorist attack;  evolutionary game;  system dynamics
分类号:
X913.4;F224.32;U492.3+36.3
DOI:
10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2022.05.003
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
为了提高恐怖袭击背景下的危险品运输安全水平和政府监管能力，首先构建政府监管部门、危险品运输企业和恐怖袭击者的三方演化博弈模型；其次引入政府动态惩罚机制和动态惩罚-补贴机制，进而采用系统动力学仿真分析动态惩罚和动态惩罚-补贴下的局中人的演化稳定策略。研究结果表明：给定情形下，引入动态惩罚机制能弥补原有模型没有稳定策略的不足；引入动态惩罚-补贴机制的模型可以演化出稳定的纯策略。
Abstract:
In order to improve the safety level on hazmat transportation and the supervision ability of government under the background of terrorist attacks,a tripartite evolutionary game model of governmental supervision department,hazmat transportation enterprises and terrorist attackers was constructed.The governmental dynamic penalty mechanism and dynamic penalty-subsidy mechanism were introduced,and the system dynamics was used to simulate and analyze the evolutionary stable strategies of players under the dynamic penalty and dynamic penalty-subsidy.The results showed that under the given conditions,introducing into the dynamic penalty mechanism could make up for the lack of stable strategy in the original model.Furthermore,the model introducing into the dynamic penalty-subsidy mechanism could evolve the stable pure strategy.

参考文献/References:

［1］朱新明,蒋志刚,白志海.交通恐怖袭击特点及反恐措施研究［J］.国防交通工程与技术,2011,9(1):4-7. ZHU Xinming,JIANG Zhigang,BAI Zhihai.Study of the characteristics of the terrorist attacks andantiterrorism measures in traffic［J］.Traffic Engineering and Technologyfor National Defence,2011,9(1):4-7.
［2］康锦伟,曾昭龙.基于博弈论的城市街道恐怖袭击方法研究［J］.中国人民公安大学学报(自然科学版),2021,27(1):90-95. KANG Jinwei，ZENG Zhaolong.Research on urban street terrorist attack method based on game theory［J］.Journal of People’s Public Security University of China ( Science and Technology),2021,27(1):90-95.
［3］胡小依,帅斌,种鹏云.危险品运输网络恐怖袭击风险定量研究［J］.计算机应用研究,2014,31(6):1723-1726. HU Xiaoyi,SHUAI Bin,CHONG Pengyun.Hazardous materials transportation network risk assessment of terrorist attack［J］.Application Research of Computers,2014,31(6):1723-1726.
［4］宋伟程,帅斌,种鹏云.恐怖袭击引发的危险品运输事故人员疏散范围研究［J］.安全与环境学报,2015,15(1):176-182. SONG Weicheng,SHUAI Bin,CHONG Pengyun.Evacuation scope study of hazardous materials transportation accidents in case of terroristattacks［J］.Journal of Safety and Environment,2015,15(1):176-182.
［5］崔萌.协同治理背景下环保信用监管的三方演化博弈分析［J］.系统工程理论与实践,2021,41(3):713-726. CUI Meng.Tripartite evolutionary game analysis for environmental creditsupervision under the background of collaborative governance［J］.Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice,2021,41(3):713-726.
［6］梁雁茹,刘亦晴.COVID-19疫情下医疗防护用品市场监管演化博弈与稳定性分析［J/OL］.中国管理科学:1-11［2020-11-22］.https://doi.org/10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.0448.
［7］MA Y,ZHAO Q.Decision-making in safety efforts:role of the government in reducing the probability of workplace accidents in China ［J］.Safety Science,2018,104:81-90.
［8］YANG Y,YANG W,CHEN H,et al.China’s energy whistleblowing and energy supervision policy:an evolutionary game perspective［J］.Energy,2020,213:118774.
［9］李健,王雅洁,吴军,等.零星危险化学品快递运输风险博弈分析［J］.中国安全生产科学技术,2016,12(3):108-114. LI Jian,WANG Yajie,WU Jun,et al.Game analysis on risk in express transportation of sporadic hazardous chemicals［J］.Journal of Safety Science and Technology,2016,12(3):108-114.
［10］刘家国,王军进,周欢,等.基于安全风险等级的港口危化品监管问题研究［J］.系统工程理论与实践,2018,38(5):1141-1152. LIU Jiaguo,WANG Junjin,ZHOU Huan,et al.Research on supervision problems of port hazardous chemicalsbase on security risk level［J］.Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice,2018,38(5):1141-1152.
［11］韩震,王菡,孟好.基于系统动力学的港口危险品管理演化博弈分析［J］.大连海事大学学报,2019,45(2):28-35. HAN Zhen,WANG Han,MENG Hao.Evolutionary game analysis of hazardous goods management in ports based on system dynamics［J］.Journal of Dalian Maritime University,2019,45(2):28-35.
［12］REILLY A,NOZICK L,XU N,et al.Game theory-based identification of facility use restrictions for the movement of hazardous materials under terrorist threat［J］.Transportation Research Part E:Logistics and Transportation Review,2011,48(1):115-131.
［13］雷渝,帅斌,米荣伟,等.基于半定量的FRAM道路危险品运输事故分析方法研究［J］.中国安全生产科学技术,2021,17(8):29-35. LEI Yu,SHUAI Bin,MI Rongwei,et al.Research on FRAM analysis method of accidents in dangerous goods transportation by road based on semi-quantitative method［J］.Journal of Safety Science and Technology,2021,17(8):29-35.
［14］黄丽达,陈建国,袁宏永,等.基于博弈论的天然气管网恐怖袭击脆弱性分析［J］.清华大学学报(自然科学版),2017,57(6):609-613. HUANG Lida,CHEN Jianguo,YUAN Hongyong,et al.Terrorist attack vulnerability analysis of a natural gas network based on the Attacker-Defender game model［J］.Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology),2017,57(6):609-613.
［15］龙圣杰,刘衍民,隋杰.生化恐怖袭击情境下引导疏散中行人行为仿真研究［J］.中国安全生产科学技术,2016,12(7):174-179. LONG Shengjie,LIU Yanmin,SUI Jie.Study on simulation of pedestrian behaviors in guided evacuation under biochemical terrorist attack［J］.Journal of Safety Science and Technology,2016,12(7):174-179.
［16］项寅.恐怖分子入侵阻止网络的双层规划建模与禁忌搜索分析［J］.运筹与管理,2020,29(10):1-10. XIANG Yin.A Bi-level network interdiction model and Tabu-search method for preventing terrorist invasion［J］.Operations Research and Management Science,2020,29(10):1-10.
［17］KHALIL H.Nonlinear Systems (3rd)［M］.Upper Saddle River,NJ:Prentice Hall,2002.
［18］ERKUT E,TJANDRA S A,VERTER V.Chapter 9 hazardous materials transportation［J］.Surveys in Operations Research and Management Science,2007,14:539-621.

相似文献/References:

[1]缪克银.危险品货物运输安全策略的分析与研究[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2011,7(12):103.
　MIAO Ke-yin.Analysis and research on the safety strategy of dangerous transportation[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2011,7(5):103.
[2]陈农田,周长春,谭鑫.我国通用航空安全监管问题研究[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2012,8(3):198.
　CHEN Nong tian,ZHOU Chang chun,TAN Xin.Discussion on safety supervision of civil general aviation[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2012,8(5):198.
[3]张玉萍.美国航空运输安全监管体系发展研究[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2012,8(10):191.
　ZHANG Yu ping.Study on development of safety oversight system of air transportation in the United States[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2012,8(5):191.
[4]陈亚云,韩文涛,崔鹤平.灰色关联度在危险品运输路径选择中的应用[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2013,9(2):121.
　CHEN Ya yun,HAN Wen tao,CUI He ping.Application of gray correlative degree on hazardous material transportation route optimization[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2013,9(5):121.
[5]秦跃进,张辉,李芒,等.化工园区安全生产监管存在问题及对策[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2010,6(1):144.
　QIN Yue-jin,ZHANG Hui,LI Mang,et al.Study on the problems and countermeasures of the safety supervision and management of chemical industry parks[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2010,6(5):144.
[6]章博,贾艳,李山生,等.基于Web的企业安全监管信息系统[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2013,9(4):144.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2013.04.027]
　ZHANG Bo,JIA Yan,LI Shan sheng,et al.A web-based safety management information system for enterprises[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2013,9(5):144.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2013.04.027]
[7]吴武生,徐三元,陈国华.协同理论视角下安全监管机制研究[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2013,9(4):150.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2013.04.028]
　WU Wu sheng,XU San yuan,CHEN Guo hua.Study on safety supervision mechanism based on synergetics[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2013,9(5):150.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2013.04.028]
[8]范满长,高西林,程志勇,等.不同薪酬结构模式下煤矿安全监管合谋行为博弈分析[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2013,9(12):52.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2013.12.008]
　FAN Man chang,GAO Xi lin,CHENG Zhi yong,et al.Game analysis on collusive behavior of coal mine safety supervision under different salary structure model[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2013,9(5):52.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2013.12.008]
[9]陈晓董,多英全.化工园区安全容量分析探讨[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2009,5(2):10.
　Researches on safety capacity of chemical industry park.[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2009,5(5):10.
[10]师立晨,王如君,多英全.我国危险化学品重大危险源安全监管存在问题及建议[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2014,10(12):161.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2014.12.027]
　SHI Li-chen,WANG Ru-jun,DUO Ying-quan.Problems and suggestions of safety supervision of dangerous chemicals major hazard in China[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2014,10(5):161.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2014.12.027]

备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期： 2022-01-18
* 基金项目： 北京市自然科学基金项目（9222024）
作者简介： 李圆圆，博士研究生，主要研究方向为危险品运输优化。
通信作者： 吴军，博士，教授，主要研究方向为危险品运输优化，经济博弈论。
更新日期/Last Update: 2022-06-15