|本期目录/Table of Contents|

[1]范满长,高西林,程志勇,等.不同薪酬结构模式下煤矿安全监管合谋行为博弈分析[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2013,9(12):52-56.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2013.12.008]
　FAN Man chang,GAO Xi lin,CHENG Zhi yong,et al.Game analysis on collusive behavior of coal mine safety supervision under different salary structure model[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2013,9(12):52-56.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2013.12.008]
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不同薪酬结构模式下煤矿安全监管合谋行为博弈分析
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《中国安全生产科学技术》[ISSN:1673-193X/CN:11-5335/TB]

卷:
9
期数:
2013年12期
页码:
52-56
栏目:
学术论著
出版日期:
2013-12-30

文章信息/Info

Title:
Game analysis on collusive behavior of coal mine safety supervision under different salary structure model
作者:
范满长1; 高西林1; 程志勇1; 刘广平2
（1平顶山天安煤业天力有限责任公司， 河南平顶山467000；2河北工业大学 经济管理学院， 天津300401）
Author(s):
FAN Manchang1; GAO Xilin1;  CHENG Zhiyong1;  LIU Guangping2
（1Tianli Co., Ltd of Pingdingshan Tianan Coal Industry, Pingdingshan Henan 467000, China;  2School of Economics and Management, Hebei University of Technology, Tianjin 300401, China）
关键词:
煤矿企业; 安全监管; 薪酬结构; 合谋行为; 博弈
Keywords:
coal mine enterprise;  safety supervision;  salary structure;  collusive behavior;  game theory
分类号:
X936
DOI:
10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2013.12.008
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
分别从固定工资和固定加安全绩效工资两种监理薪酬结构模式对煤矿企业与地方监管部门间的合谋行为以及中央监管部门的监督行为进行了博弈分析。研究发现，固定加安全绩效工资模式下的煤矿企业与地方监管部门合谋的最优概率较小。为了减少中央监管部门监督的概率，应当降低煤矿企业与地方监管部门合谋时的安全绩效工资。最后给出了降低合谋行为的发生和中央监管部门监督概率的应对措施。
Abstract:
In this paper, the game analysis on the collusive behavior between coal mine enterprise and local regulatory authority and the supervision behavior of central regulatory authority was conducted from fixed salary model and fixed plus performance salary model. The results showed that the optimal probability of the collusive between coal mine enterprise and local regulatory authority is lower. In order to reduce the supervision probability of the central regulatory authority, the safety performance wage should be reduced when the collusion happen between the local regulatory authority and coal mine enterprise. Lastly, some corresponding measures were put forward to reduce the probability for the occurrence of collusion and supervision of central regulatory authority.

参考文献/References:

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
国家安全生产监督管理总局重点课题（10067）
更新日期/Last Update: 2013-12-30