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[1]江雯,孟耀斌,李盛泽.组织与成员双重视角下危化品安全生产政企互动分析*[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2023,19(9):157-163.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2023.09.023]
　JIANG Wen,MENG Yaobin,LI Shengze.Analysis of interaction between government and enterprise in work safety of hazardous chemicals from dual perspectives of organizations and members[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2023,19(9):157-163.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2023.09.023]
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组织与成员双重视角下危化品安全生产政企互动分析*
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《中国安全生产科学技术》[ISSN:1673-193X/CN:11-5335/TB]

卷:
19
期数:
2023年9期
页码:
157-163
栏目:
职业安全卫生管理与技术
出版日期:
2023-09-30

文章信息/Info

Title:
Analysis of interaction between government and enterprise in work safety of hazardous chemicals from dual perspectives of organizations and members
文章编号:
1673-193X(2023)-09-0157-07
作者:
江雯; 孟耀斌; 李盛泽
（1.北京师范大学 地理科学学部，北京 100875；
2.北京师范大学 国家安全与应急管理学院，北京 100875）
Author(s):
JIANG Wen;  MENG Yaobin; LI Shengze
(1.Faculty of Geographic Science,Beijing Normal University,Beijing 100875,China;
2.School of National Safety and Emergency Management,Beijing Normal University,Beijing 100875,China)
关键词:
演化博弈; 危化品; 安全生产; 政企互动
Keywords:
evolutionary game;  hazardous chemicals;  work safety;  interaction between government and enterprises
分类号:
X913.4
DOI:
10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2023.09.023
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
为解决当前政企安全生产投入不足的现实困境，从组织和成员2个维度构建政企双方演化博弈模型，深入探究危化品安全生产的协同演化路径及其关键影响因素。研究结果表明：组织成员对自身收入、晋升、身心健康等核心利益的关切及损益的敏感度远高于其对组织可能蒙受损失的关注；若事故发生概率低、事故造成的预估损失较少，企业相关部门会因此低估事故造成的损失而存在较多的投机行为，但从个人的角度来看，企业员工和企业家采取策略均会收敛于“重视安全生产”；随着安全成本的增加，企业会出现从重视安全投入到轻视安全投入的策略转换，组织的转换速度更快；不论从组织的角度还是从人的角度来看，因严格监管可能导致的外来投资流失而带来的压力，都会促使政府方面做出宽松监管的决策。研究结果可为深入理解危化品安全生产政企博弈机制及推进危化品安全生产工作提供参考。
Abstract:
To address the current practical difficulties of insufficient investment in work safety by government and enterprises,an evolutionary game model of government and enterprises was constructed from two dimensions of organizations and members,so as to further explore the co-evolutionary path and key influencing factors of the work safety of hazardous chemicals.The results show that the the members of organizations are much more sensitive to the concern and the gain and loss in their core interests such as income,promotion,physical and mental health than to the possible losses of organizations.If the probability of accident is low and the estimated loss caused by the accident is small,the relevant departments of the enterprise will therefore underestimate the loss caused by the accident and have more speculative behavior.However,from the perspective of personal,the strategies adopted by employees and entrepreneurs will converge to “pay attention to work safety”.As the safety costs increase,the enterprises will undergo a strategic transition from emphasizing safety investment to neglecting safety investment,with organizations switching at a faster rate.Regardless of the perspectives of organizations or personnel,the pressure resulting from strict supervision,which may lead to the outflow of external investment,will prompt the government to make decisions about relaxed supervision.The research results can provide references for a deeper understanding of the game mechanism between government and enterprise regarding hazardous chemicals,as well as for promoting the work safety.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期： 2023-04-13
* 基金项目： 国家重点研发计划项目(2022YFC3004404)
作者简介： 江雯，硕士研究生，主要研究方向为风险量化评估。
通信作者： 孟耀斌，博士，副教授，主要研究方向为暴露模拟与风险分析。
更新日期/Last Update: 2023-10-12