|本期目录/Table of Contents|

[1]李莎莎,崔铁军.系统操作者与管理者行为的博弈演化与收益分析*[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2021,17(8):172-176.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2021.08.027]
　LI Shasha,CUI Tiejun.Game evolution and profit analysison behavior of system operators and managers[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2021,17(8):172-176.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2021.08.027]
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系统操作者与管理者行为的博弈演化与收益分析*
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《中国安全生产科学技术》[ISSN:1673-193X/CN:11-5335/TB]

卷:
17
期数:
2021年8期
页码:
172-176
栏目:
职业安全卫生管理与技术
出版日期:
2021-08-31

文章信息/Info

Title:
Game evolution and profit analysison behavior of system operators and managers
文章编号:
1673-193X(2021)-08-0172-05
作者:
李莎莎; 崔铁军
（1.辽宁工程技术大学 工商管理学院，辽宁 葫芦岛 125105；
2.辽宁工程技术大学 安全科学与工程学院，辽宁 阜新 123000）
Author(s):
LI Shasha;  CUI Tiejun
(1.School of Business Administration,Liaoning Technical University,Huludao Liaoning 125105,China;
2.School of Safety Science and Engineering,Liaoning Technical University,Fuxin Liaoning 123000,China)
关键词:
安全系统工程; 博弈论; 空间故障网络; 博弈过程演化; 收益分析
Keywords:
safety system engineering;  game theory;  space fault network;  game process evolution;  profit analysis
分类号:
X913
DOI:
10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2021.08.027
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
为研究工程项目系统中，操作者安全行为与管理者奖惩行为的相互博弈情况，确定操作者和管理者收益，提出博弈演化与收益分析方法。操作者代表系统实际使用者，行为包括安全和不安全行为；管理者代表系统管理者和所有者，行为包括奖励和惩罚行为。确定方法的基本参数；研究博弈演化过程的博弈逻辑关系，从悲观和乐观角度研究二者不同行为相互作用后的收益关系，给出操作者收益和管理者收益的逻辑表达式。结果表明：方法能得到博弈过程演化结果，同时能根据收益结果表达式判断博弈胜出方。
Abstract:
In order to study the mutual game between the safety behavior of operators and the reward and punishment behaviors of managers in the engineering project system,and determine the profits of operators and managers,a method of game evolution and profit analysis was proposed.The operators represented the actual users of system,whose behavior included the safe and unsafe behavior.The managers represented the managers and owners of system,whose behavior included the reward and punishment behaviors.The basic parameters of the method were determined,and the game logic relationship in the game evolution process was studied.The profit relationship of both of them after the interaction of different behavior was studied from the perspectives of pessimism and optimism,and the logic expressions of the operators’ profit and managers’ profit were given.The results showed that the method could obtain the evolution results of game process and judge the game winner according to the expressions of profit results.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期： 2021-01-01
* 基金项目： 国家自然科学基金项目(52004120);辽宁省教育厅项目(LJ2020QNL018);国家重点研发计划项目(2017YFC1503102);辽宁工程技术大学学科创新团队项目（LNTU20TD-31）
作者简介： 李莎莎，博士，讲师，主要研究方向为安全系统工程及安全管理科学。
更新日期/Last Update: 2021-09-08