|本期目录/Table of Contents|

[1]杜丽敬,黄文青,蔡琦,等.政府监管下危化品运输安全三方演化博弈分析*[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2026,22(5):175-182.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2026.05.021]
 Du Lijing,Huang Wenqing,Cai Qi,et al.Tripartite evolutionary game analysis on the safety of hazardous chemicals transportation under government supervision[J].Journal of Safety Science and Technology,2026,22(5):175-182.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2026.05.021]
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政府监管下危化品运输安全三方演化博弈分析*

《中国安全生产科学技术》[ISSN:1673-193X/CN:11-5335/TB]

卷:
22
期数:
2026年5期
页码:
175-182
栏目:
公共安全与应急管理
出版日期:
2026-05-30

文章信息/Info

Title:
Tripartite evolutionary game analysis on the safety of hazardous chemicals transportation under government supervision
文章编号:
1673-193X(2026)-05-0175-08
作者:
杜丽敬黄文青蔡琦雷松
(1.武汉理工大学 管理学院,湖北 武汉 430070;
2.武汉理工大学 安全科学与应急管理学院,湖北 武汉 430070)
Author(s):
Du Lijing Huang Wenqing Cai Qi Lei Song
(1.School of Management, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan Hubei 430070, China;
2.School of Safety Science and Emergency Management,Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan Hubei 430070,China)
关键词:
危化品运输安全运输演化博弈严格监管
Keywords:
hazardous chemicals transport safety evolutionary game theory model strict regulatory
分类号:
X951;F224.32
DOI:
10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2026.05.021
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
为降低危化品运输风险,减少安全事故的发生,构建政府、危化品运输企业和驾驶员三方的演化博弈模型,结合系统动力学建模仿真,分析危化品运输安全的行为演化机理,提出运输安全综合管理策略。研究结果表明:政府仅依靠高额罚款或严格监管,无法长期维持稳定的运输安全状态,处罚力度较小时,政府严格监管概率上升越快且越早趋于稳定;政府监管成本存在临界点效应,当监管成本高于某一阈值时,政府会选择宽松监管,导致企业违规行为增加;除三方合规的均衡情况外,还存在政府和驾驶员合规、企业违规的均衡情况,有必要实施差异化的监管策略;奖励机制边际效益呈现递增趋势。研究结果有助于理解危化品运输安全三方博弈机制,并为政府优化监管策略提供理论参考。
Abstract:
In order to reduce the risk of hazardous chemical transportation and the safety incidents,this study employs an evolutionary game model involving the government,hazardous chemical transport enterprises and drivers,combines with system dynamics modelling and simulation,and analyses the evolutionary mechanism of transport safety.It proposes a comprehensive management strategy of transportation safety.Findings indicate that governments cannot sustain stable transportation safety long-term through heavy fines or strict regulatory alone.When penalties are lenient,the probability of stringent government oversight increases more rapidly and stabilizes sooner.Regulatory costs exhibit a critical threshold effect: exceeding a certain threshold prompts governments to adopt lax oversight,leading to increased corporate non-compliance.Beyond the tripartite compliance equilibrium,scenarios where the government and drivers comply while enterprises violate regulations may emerge,necessitating differentiated regulatory approaches.The marginal benefits of incentive mechanisms exhibit an increasing trend.These findings enhance understanding of the tripartite game dynamics in hazardous chemical transport safety and provide theoretical guidance for optimizing regulatory strategies.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期: 2025-10-10;修回日期:2026-04-14
* 基金项目: 国家自然科学基金项目(72372124);国家重点研发计划项目(2023YFC3008802)
作者简介: 杜丽敬,博士,副教授,主要研究方向为物流与供应链管理。
通信作者: 雷松,博士研究生,主要研究方向为应急管理。
更新日期/Last Update: 2026-06-03