[1]蒋权,贾明滔,高开欣.动态群体安全投入博弈模拟*——以我国煤矿为例[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2023,19(4):176-181.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2023.04.025]
JIANG Quan,JIA Mingtao,GAO Kaixin.Simulation of dynamic group safety input game: a case study of coal mine in China[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2023,19(4):176-181.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2023.04.025]
点击复制
动态群体安全投入博弈模拟*——以我国煤矿为例
JIANG Quan,JIA Mingtao,GAO Kaixin.Simulation of dynamic group safety input game: a case study of coal mine in China[J].JOURNAL OF SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,2023,19(4):176-181.[doi:10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2023.04.025]
《中国安全生产科学技术》[ISSN:1673-193X/CN:11-5335/TB]
- 卷:
- 19
- 期数:
- 2023年4期
- 页码:
- 176-181
- 栏目:
- 职业安全卫生管理与技术
- 出版日期:
- 2023-04-30
文章信息/Info
- Title:
- Simulation of dynamic group safety input game: a case study of coal mine in China
- 文章编号:
- 1673-193X(2023)-04-0176-06
- 分类号:
- X921
- 文献标志码:
- A
- 摘要:
- 为探究煤矿生产中的群体安全投入博弈特点，针对煤矿生产参与者面临的安全投入囚徒困境（SIPD）博弈，基于NetLogo模拟平台设计博弈模型，获取不同安全投入策略的工人群体变化、死亡情况和安全收益特征，探究不同安全环境对博弈结果的影响。研究结果表明：在低安全水平煤矿中，消极型工人（D-worker）可以利用积极型工人（C-worker）的安全投入，快速增加消极型群体规模，并攫取高达70%的安全收益，而在高安全水平煤矿中，在制裁型工人（T-worker）影响下，D-worker安全收益可被限制到20.4%。D-worker在恶劣安全环境中将成为主流，攫取最大安全收益，产生较高死亡率，并严重损害群体安全，扭转上述局面的短期方法为抑制群体消极心理，长期方法为逐步提高安全管理技术水平。研究结果可为我国煤矿安全水平提升提供安全投入策略参考。
- Abstract:
- In order to explore the characteristics of group safety input game in coal mine production,a game model was designed based on NetLogo simulation platform for the safety input prisoner’s dilemma (SIPD) game faced by the participants of coal mine production.The characteristics of group change,death and safety benefits of worders under different safety input strategies were obtained,and the influence of different game environment on the game results was explored.The results showed that in the coal mines with low safety level,the negative Defect-worker (D-worker) could use the safety input of positive Cooperate-worker (C-worker),rapidly increase the scale of negative groups,and seize up to 70% of safety benefits.In the coal mines with high safety level,under the influence of sanctioned Tit-for-Tat-worker (T-worker),the safety benefits of D-worker could be limited to 20.4%.The D-worker would become the mainstream in the harsh safety environment,seize the maximum safety benefits,produce the higher mortality rate,and seriously damage the group safety.The short-term way to reverse this situation was to suppress the group’s negative psychology,and the long-term way was to gradually improve the level of safety management and safety technology.The research results can provide safety input strategy reference for the improvement of coal mine safety level in China.
参考文献/References:
［1］JEHRING J,HEINRICH H W.Industrial accident prevention:a scientific approach［J］.Industrial and Labor Relations Review,1951,4(4):609.
［2］FENG Y B,TEO E A L,LING F Y Y,et al.Exploring the interactive effects of safety investments,safety culture and project hazard on safety performance:an empirical analysis［J］.International Journal of Project Management,2014,32(6):932-943.
［3］NEAL A,GRIFFIN M A.A study of the lagged relationships among safety climate,safety motivation,safety behavior,and accidents at the individual and group levels［J］.The Journal of Applied Psychology,2006,91(4):946-953.
［4］周国华,张羽,李延来,等.基于前景理论的施工安全管理行为演化博弈［J］.系统管理学报,2012,21(4):501-509.
ZHOU Guohua,ZHANG Yu,LI Yanlai,et al.Evolutionary game of construction safety management behavior based on prospect theory ［J］.Journal of System Management,2012,21(4):501-509.
［5］HAN Y,LI J,CAO X L,et al.Structural equation modeling approach to studying the relationships among safety investment,construction employees’ safety cognition,and behavioral performance［J］.Journal of Construction Engineering and Management,2020,146(7):04020065.
［6］FENG Y B.Effect of safety investments on safety performance of building projects［J］.Safety Science,2013,59:28-45.
［7］GAVIOUS A,MIZRAHI S,SHANI Y,et al.The costs of industrial accidents for the organization:developing methods and tools for evaluation and cost-benefit analysis of investment in safety［J］.Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries,2009,22(4):434-438.
［8］LU M,CHEUNG C M,LI H,et al.Understanding the relationship between safety investment and safety performance of construction projects through agent-based modeling［J］.Accident Analysis and Prevention,2016,94:8-17.
［9］李豪峰,高鹤.我国煤矿生产安全监管的博弈分析［J］.煤炭经济研究,2004(7):72-75.
LI Haofeng,GAO He.Game analysis of China’s coal mine production safety supervision ［J］.Coal Economic Research,2004(7):72-75.
［10］DOEBELI M,HAUERT C.Models of cooperation based on the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game［J］.Ecology Letters,2005,8(7):748-766.
［11］SMITH J M.Evolution and the theory of games［J］.American Scientist,1976,64(1):41-45.
［12］吴超.安全统计学［M］.北京：机械工业出版社,2014.
［13］AXELROD R.The Evolution of Cooperation ［M］.New York:Basic Books,1985.
［14］JIANG F C,LAI E,SHAN Y X,et al.A set theory-based model for safety investment and accident control in coal mines［J］.Process Safety and Environmental Protection,2020,136:253-258.
［15］国家统计局.中华人民共和国2021年国民经济和社会发展统计公报［EB/OL］.(2022-02-28)［2022-09-09］.http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-02/28/content_5676015.htm.
［16］KEYNES J M.The general theory of employment,interest and money［M］.New York: Harcourt,Brace and Co.,1936.
［17］JAMES O W,CHARLES D R,HANLEY F,et al.A repetition of asch’s “effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgment”［J］.Perceptual and Motor Skills,1957,7(3):245.
［18］陈洋.煤矿员工不安全羊群行为驱动机理及管控研究［D］.徐州:中国矿业大学,2020.
［19］AMPONSAH T K,JAIN A,LEKA S,et al.Examining psychosocial and physical hazards in the ghanaian mining industry and their implications for employees’ safety experience［J］.Journal of Safety Research,2013,45:75-84.
［20］WILENSKY U.Netlogo home page［EB/OL］.［2022-09-09］.http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/.
相似文献/References:
备注/Memo
- 备注/Memo:
-
收稿日期： 2022-09-27
* 基金项目： 国家重点研发计划项目(2019YFC0605304)
作者简介： 蒋权，博士研究生，主要研究方向为矿山安全。
通信作者： 贾明滔，博士，教授，主要研究方向为矿山安全技术。
